Interim Commissioner of Competition John Pecman and Senior Deputy Commissioner of Mergers Kelley McKinnon recently attended a breakfast seminar at Stikeman Elliott, to speak to an overflow crowd of clients and to answer questions related to their visions for the future of the Competition Bureau.
April 3, 2013 the Ontario Court of Appeal released its reasons for decision in R v. Dowdall, affirming the Superior Court’s earlier decision to commit 17 defendants to stand trial on charges of bid-rigging under s.47 of the Competition Act. The defendants had argued that tenders submitted to pre-qualify as approved suppliers, or to create a standing order, if and when such services were required, was not a “bid or tender” and thus fell outside the ambit of the prohibition against bid-rigging.
Both the Superior Court and Court of Appeal agreed that the preliminary inquiry judge reasonably concluded that there was some evidence that the process of obtaining a Standing Offer Agreement was contractual and could be considered a “request for bids or tenders” under the bid-rigging offence.
On April 15, 2013, the Competition Tribunal dismissed the Competition Bureau’s application (the Application) against Canada’s largest real estate board, the Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB). The Tribunal found that the abuse of dominance provision under section 79 of the Competition Act(the Act) did not apply to the facts of the case, which pertained to TREB’s membership rules governing the use of its Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data.
The Bureau’s May 27, 2011 application requested that TREB eliminate rules allegedly denying its real estate agent members the ability to introduce Internet-based real estate brokerage services by limiting the use the members could make of the MLS listings and related data.
On February 25, 2013, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) released its decision upholding the Competition Tribunal’s Order requiring that Tervita Corporation (formerly known as CCS Corporation) divest the Babkirk hazardous waste landfill site in northeastern British Columbia following its acquisition of Complete Environmental Inc. The decision provides guidelines for determining a reasonable period of time for likely market entry in a “prevent” case, as well as clearer guidance on what is “in” and what is “out” for a section 96 efficiencies defense. It also marks a rare challenge to a closed, and non-notifiable transaction.
Background
In February 2010, Complete received regulatory approval to open the Babkirk landfill. Construction had not yet commenced when Tervita acquired the site from Complete. At the time of the transaction, Tervita operated the only two operational secure landfills for hazardous waste in British Columbia. The Commissioner of Competition therefore alleged that the transaction substantially prevented competition in hazardous waste landfill in northeastern B.C.
Parties considering retail mergers should take note of the approach that the Canadian Competition Bureau took in analyzing the proposed acquisition of The Brick Ltd. and its subsidiaries (The Brick) by Leon’s Furniture Limited (Leon’s). Stikeman Elliott LLP has experience acting as competition counsel in a number of retail mergers, including the recent acquisition by Canadian Tire of Forzani, in which the Bureau took a similar approach. Both retail merger reviews highlighted the key role of econometrics in the Bureau’s assessment of whether the merged entity will have the ability to increase prices.
On March 19, 2013, the Bureau released a position statement in respect of the merger of the two national retailers of furniture, mattresses, appliances and electronics. The Commissioner of Competition issued a “no action letter” to Leon’s and The Brick on March 11, 2013, meaning the merger will not be challenged. The Bureau’s review focused on the potential competitive effects in the retailing of furniture and mattresses. Leon’s and The Brick were viewed as particularly close competitors in respect of furniture and mattresses, with a high degree of differentiation from other competitors.
Recent remarks by Canada’s Interim Commissioner, John Pecman, reinforce the view that the Bureau is pursuing all avenues available to it under the Competition Actto fulfill its mandate of investigating and challenging civil and/or criminal anti-competitive practices. In this respect, the interim Commissioner noted three of the Bureau’s priorities going forward:
focused enforcement and strategic regulatory interventions designed to benefit Canadians;
applying Canada's competition laws in a transparent and predictable manner; and
developing trust through enhanced collaboration
In addition to these priorities, Mr. Pecman noted that the Bureau would assist in providing clarification on the Act’s price maintenance provisions, issues that have arisen in the context of electronic document production, the Bureau’s leniency program for those that cooperate in criminal investigations, and investigative procedures.
Investment Canada – The Year of the State-Owned Enterprise
2012 proved to be a highly eventful year for foreign investment law in Canada. Although numerous foreign investments by SOEs in the Canadian energy sector had received foreign investment approvals in recent years1, the summer of 2012 saw the announcement of two multi-billion dollar energy transactions involving SOEs that collectively posed an unprecedented test for the Investment Canada Act and for Canadian policymakers. In June, Petronas (the Malaysian state-owned oil company) announced its $6 billion acquisition of Progress Energy. At the time, this was the largest-ever proposed acquisition of a Canadian company by a state-owned enterprise. But that record did not stand for long: just a month later, in July, CNOOC Limited (a majority Chinese state-owned oil company)announced its $15 billion acquisition of Nexen.
These proposed acquisitions became the subject of intense scrutiny in the national media throughout the summer and fall, and indeed attracted attention in the business press globally, particularly in Asia. With few exceptions, large-scale M&A activity in the Canadian oil patch ground to a halt in the fall of 2012 as market participants stood still and held their collective breath pending the outcome of the government reviews of these proposed foreign investments. Tension was only heightened in October when the Minister of Industry rejected the Petronas transaction on a preliminary basis, immediately recalling the rejection of BHP Billiton’s hostile bid for Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan less than two years earlier.
On December 14, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that it had withdrawn criminal charges related to the breach of a consent agreement in a waste-collection company merger due to the accidental leak of privileged information during the course of the Bureau’s investigation.
The Bureau said in its statement that on September 19, 2012, it “became aware of an unfortunate procedural error, where certain information subject to solicitor-client privilege had been inadvertently shared with investigators.” As previously covered on this blog, on September 11, 2012, the Bureau laid criminal charges against Progressive Waste Solutions Ltd. and its subsidiary BFI Canada Inc. (known together as Progressive). The Bureau alleged that Progressive had violated the terms of a consent agreement it had entered into with the Bureau in 2010. The Bureau concluded at the time that the merger would result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the waste collection market in several Canadian cities.
On November 14, the Competition Bureau published a news release disputing a statement made by the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS) related to the Bureau’s ongoing investigation of alleged collusive conduct in the setting of the LIBOR benchmark rate. In its third-quarter Interim Management Statement, RBS stated that it was “co-operating fully” with investigations by the Bureau and other regulators. The Bureau’s news release argued that this statement was false, in light of the fact that RBS had not applied to its leniency or immunity programs and that RBS had challenged a court order obliging it to produce documents in connection with the Bureau’s investigation.
In its reply, RBS emphasized that it did want to cooperate with the Bureau, but that the production of documents requested by the Bureau would violate privacy laws in the United Kingdom. RBS stated that it had offered a number of alternative mechanisms, but that the Bureau had refused such offers.
This is not the first time the Bureau has intervened when it believed a public statement by a company was inaccurate. In September 2011, the Bureau required Beiersdorf Canada Inc. to correct an allegedly inaccurate public statement the company made in relation to a settlement it had reached with the Bureau. Businesses should take note that the Bureau is active in monitoring comments they make in the press and in public disclosure filings.
In his first published remarks as Interim Commissioner of Competition, John Pecman discussed a number of competition-related issues, underscoring the importance of compliance programs, the competition risks associated with participation in trade associations, and the Bureau’s key enforcement priorities going forward.
Mr. Pecman, who was appointed Interim Commissioner on September 26, noted the increasing international prevalence and cooperative enforcement of competition law. He also emphasized the seriousness of cartel activity, referring to Chief Justice Crampton’s remarks in the case against Maxzone Auto Parts, where Mr. Justice Crampton likened cartel agreements to fraud and approved incarceration as an effective deterrent.
During the seminar, Paul Collins, having just returned to Stikeman Elliott following a two-year term as Senior Deputy Commissioner – Mergers Branch, spoke of recent developments at the Competition Bureau with a focus on recent enforcement activities and priorities. Litigator Katherine Kay summarized the current state of play of competition law class actions in Canada, while Shawn Neylan emphasized the importance of implementing an effective competition law compliance program in light of the Bureau’s recent enforcement activities. Meanwhile, Susan Hutton provided an update on and explained the significance of recent amendments and proposed amendments to the Investment Canada Act in relation to enforcement, review thresholds and new filing requirements.
On September 5, the World Economic Forum released the 2012-2013 edition of its Global Competitiveness Report. The Report uses financial and statistical data as well as executive opinion surveys to rank countries on a wide variety of metrics related to social and economic competitiveness. Canada was ranked 14th overall, down two places from its result in 2011-2012.
Of interest to businesses and competition counsel, Canada ranked 21st overall in the “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy” category. Respondents to the executive opinion survey were asked to what extent they felt that anti-monopoly policy promoted competition in their respective countries, on a scale of one to seven (with a score of seven meaning that anti-monopoly policy “effectively promote[d] competition”). The mean score was 4.0. Canada scored 4.9, beneath countries such as the U.S. (also 4.9; 17th overall) and the U.K. (5.2; 10th overall), and even Qatar (5.3; 8th overall) and South Africa (5.3; 6th overall). The honour of ‘most effective anti-monopoly policy’ went to Norway, with a score of 5.7.
On September 26, 2012, John Pecman was appointedas the new Interim Commissioner of Competition, to lead the Competition Bureau until a new Commissioner of Competition is appointed. In announcing Mr. Pecman’s appointment the Minister of Industry, the Honourable Christian Paradis said “"With nearly 30 years of experience at the Bureau, Mr. Pecman has a keen understanding of competition law and marketplace conduct."
Mr. Pecman joined the Competition Bureau in 1984 and has worked extensively in the enforcement branches of the Competition Bureau, the agency that he now heads as Interim Commissioner. He has been involved in numerous leading cases as the senior officer, some of which were resolved on consent or by guilty plea, others of which were contested before the Competition Tribunal.
On September 20, 2012, Canada’s Competition Bureau (the Bureau) published the final version of its long-awaited Enforcement Guidelines on the abuse of dominance provisions (sections 78 and 79) of the Competition Act (the Final Guidelines). The Guidelines have been more than three years in the making. An initial draft released in January of 2009 was the subject of considerable public comment, but was never finalized. The Bureau released a draft version of substantially revised guidelines for public consultation on March 22, 2012 (the Draft Guidelines). After receiving and reviewing submissions from interested parties, the Bureau has now released the final version, which replaces all of the Bureau’s previous publications on the abuse of dominance provisions.
In general, the Final Guidelines are substantively similar to the Draft Guidelines. There are no significant changes in the Final Guidelines as compared to the Draft Guidelines.
On September 11, the Competition Bureau announced that it had laid criminal charges against Progressive Waste Solutions Ltd. and its subsidiary, BFI Canada Inc., alleging that Progressive had violated the terms of a consent agreement it had entered into in 2010. The consent agreement was reached in respect of a merger between IESC-BFC Ltd. and Waste Services Inc. (now known together as Progressive), two commercial waste collection companies. The Bureau concluded at the time that the merger would result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the waste collection market in several Canadian cities, and entered into a consent agreement with the merging parties which required them to divest certain assets in the affected markets. The consent agreement also provided that the parties could not attempt to reacquire the customers of the companies who purchased the divested assets for one year following the divestitures. In October and December of 2010, the Bureau approved divestiture buyers. Now, the Bureau alleges that Progressive violated the terms of the agreement by soliciting and reacquiring a customer whose contract had been divested, and then providing a false declaration of compliance and failing promptly to notify the Bureau of the breach.
The Canadian landfill company that lost a merger challenge at the Competition Tribunal in Canada’s first pure prevention of competition case has appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.
On January 4, 2011, the Commissioner of Competition applied to the Tribunal for an order to dissolve a merger between CCS Corporation and Complete Environmental Inc. In the alternative, the Commissioner sought an order for CCS to divest itself of Complete or Complete’s wholly–owned subsidiary, Babkirk Land Services. Babkirk had obtained approval to operate a secure landfill site in northeastern British Columbia. As such, Babkirk had been poised to compete directly with CCS. The Commissioner alleged that the merger between CCS and Complete would result in a substantial prevention of competition in the market for hazardous waste disposal in northeastern British Columbia.
On May 29, 2012, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Commissioner, finding that CCS’s acquisition of Complete would likely prevent competition substantially in the market for the supply of landfill services for solid hazardous oil and gas waste. The Tribunal ordered that CCS divest its shares or assets of Babkirk by December 28, 2012. On July 17, 2012, the Tribunal further issued a divestiture procedure order.
On July 30, 2012 Corporate Research Group Ltd. (CRG) pled guilty to a charge of bid-rigging under subsection 47(2) of the Competition Act. The bid-rigging was in relation to federal government contracts for real estate advisory services in Canada.
The guilty plea follows the Competition Bureau’s investigation into CRG’s activities after being contacted by the Department of Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC). The specific complaint related to a Request for Standing Offers (RFSO) issued by PWGSC for real estate advisory services. In its guilty plea, CRG admitted that Louis Facchini, a company representative carrying on business as First Porter Consultancy, submitted bids, in response to the RFSO, that were arrived at through an agreement that was not disclosed to PWGSC.
The Competition Bureau’s review of the Maple / TMX transaction was extensive. Maple Group (whose investors are Alberta Investment Management Corporation, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, CIBC World Markets Inc., Desjardins Financial Group, Dundee Capital Markets Inc., Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs du Québec (F.T.Q.), National Bank Financial & Co. Inc., Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan, Scotia Capital Inc., TD Securities Inc. and The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company) announced on May 15, 2011, in the midst of the failed bid by the TSX to merge with the LSE, that the Group had submitted a proposal to acquire the TMX Group. Maple filed an application for an advance ruling certificate on June 7, 2011. The transaction was therefore under active Competition Bureau review for a period of some 13 months.
On June 28, 2012, Canada’s Commissioner of Competition, Melanie Aitken, announced her decision to leave her post, effective September 21, 2012.
Commissioner Aitken was appointed to a five-year term in August 2009, having replaced the previous Commissioner, Sheridan Scott, as Interim Commissioner just prior to the enactment of significant amendments to the Competition Act in March, 2009.
Ms. Aitken held the role of Assistant Deputy Commissioner in the Mergers Branch from 2005 to 2007, and was appointed head of the Mergers Branch at the end of that term. Prior to joining the Bureau, Ms. Aitken had been a commercial litigation partner with two Canadian law firms, with a secondment to the Federal Department of Justice as Senior Counsel from 2001 to 2003.
On June 22, 2012, Canada’s Competition Bureau announced that Colmatec Inc. and its operations director, Rénald Drouin, have pleaded guilty in a scheme to rig bids on contracts for specialized sewer services in the province of Québec. Charges are still pending against five other companies and their directors as part of the conspiracy, which involved bids on 37 municipal contracts worth over $3 million. A sixth company had previously pleaded guilty on November 22, 2011. Colmatec has been fined $50,000 and is subject to a court order, while Rénald Drouin will perform 100 hours of community service and is subject to a two year probation period. Bid-rigging is a criminal offence under section 47 of the Competition Act.
On May 29, 2012, the Competition Tribunal ruled in favour of the Commissioner of Competition, and ordered CCS Corporation to divest a hazardous waste landfill site, the acquisition of which the Commissioner had alleged would result in a substantial prevention of competition in the market for hazardous waste disposal in northeastern British Columbia. This was the first contested challenge to a merger by the Commissioner since 2005.
Complete Environmental had received regulatory approval to open the Babkirk landfill in February 2010, and had not yet started construction when CCS Corporation acquired the site. CCS already operates the only two operational secure landfills for hazardous waste in British Columbia. The Commissioner alleged that, through the acquisition of the Babkirk landfill, CCS had prevented the entry of a potential competitor, thereby substantially preventing competition.
The Competition Bureau has released an updated Merger Review Performance Report (Report) tracking the activities of its Mergers Branch since the last report published in May, 2010 and discussed in our previous post.
Since 2010, the Bureau has published a series of revised guidelines as part of its ongoing efforts to realign its merger review procedures following the 2009 amendments to the Competition Act and the Notifiable Transactions Regulations. The updated guidelines include:
On April 11, 2012, the Competition Bureau released a statement summarizing its review of the acquisition of retirement residences by Chartwell Seniors Housing REIT (Chartwell) and Health Care REIT Inc. (HC) of the Maestro Retirement Residences Portfolio (Maestro). The Bureau issued a No Action Letter in respect of the acquisition.
Both Chartwell and Maestro operate retirement residences in Canada, while Ohio-based HC operates retirement residences in the United States. The Bureau’s review focused on the different types of retirement residences and the local nature of competition among retirement residences. The relevant product markets were defined as Independent Supportive Living programs (ISL) and Assisted Living programs (AL), due to differences in the services offered and demand considerations for each.
On April 16, 2012, Canada’s Competition Bureau issued a statement outlining the analysis it had undertaken of Cardinal Health’s then-proposed acquisition of Futuremed to conclude that, despite some concerns expressed by certain customers, the transaction was unlikely to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in any relevant Canadian market. Stikeman Elliott acted on behalf of Cardinal Health.
Cardinal Health and Futuremed were both distributors of a broad range of medical supplies and surgical equipment to various healthcare facilities in Canada, supplying products from hundreds of global manufacturers. The Bureau noted that prices in the healthcare products distribution industry are typically set through a tendering process between manufacturers and customers, whereby manufacturers sell direct to the individual healthcare facility or, alternatively, to a buying group acting for several healthcare facilities. As such, authorized distributors of manufacturers, such as Cardinal Health and Futuremed, do not compete on price, but rather compete through the use of distribution fee rebates, quality of service and technical expertise offered to customers.
In February 2012, the SCC released its decision in Richard v. Time Inc., a case brought forward from the Quebec Court of Appeal, which considered the “general impression” test in relation to the misleading advertising provisions of the Quebec Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Given the recently increased enforcement activity of the Competition Bureau with respect to deceptive marketing practices, companies that advertise to consumers anywhere in Canada should take heed of the SCC decision. The misleading advertising provisions of the Quebec CPA are based, to a large extent, on what is now the federal Competition Act, and similar types of consumer protection laws exist in the other Canadian provinces. Accordingly, the impact of the SCC decision will go beyond the CPA, affecting enforcement of deceptive marketing practices under both federal and provincial consumer protection laws in Canada.
The SCC decision provides clear guidance on how to assess an advertisement’s target audience for purposes of the “general impression” test, and clarifies that both the layout of the advertisement and the meaning of the words, taken in their entirety, form the general impression of an advertisement. As such, regulators and companies now have a firmer understanding of what test to consider when determining whether an advertisement is misleading in a material respect.
Competition Bureau (the Bureau) has published a draft new Pre-Merger Interpretation Guideline for public consultation (Guideline #15), providing details as to how the Bureau calculates the value of “assets in Canada” and “gross revenues from sales” for purposes of the merger notification thresholds. It will be open for comment from interested parties until June 13, 2012.
The purpose of the guideline is to assist parties and their counsel in interpreting and applying the provisions of theCompetition Act (the Act) relating to notifiable transactions. This guideline sets out the general approach taken by the Bureau and may assist businesses in determining whether the parties-size and transaction-size thresholds under sections 109 and 110 of the Act are exceeded.
On March 23, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced its publication of two draft Pre-Merger Notification Interpretation Guidelines for public consultation.
The publications, dubbed Pre-Merger Notification Interpretation Guideline Number 12 and Number 14 relate respectively to the requirement to submit a New Pre-merger Notification and/or ARC Request Where a Proposed Transaction is Subsequently Amended, and Duplication Arising from Transactions Between Affiliates.
The Competition Bureau announced yesterday that it has released its long-awaited revised draft Abuse of Dominance Guidelines outlining the Bureau’s approach to reviewable matters under sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act. The newly released Guidelines are intended to replace the draft guidelines released in January, 2009, which was the first time the Bureau had updated its enforcement approach to abuse of dominance since 2001.
Abuse of dominance occurs when a dominant firm (or group of firms) in a market engage in a practice of anti-competitive acts that result, or are likely to result, in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition. Sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act allow the Competition Tribunal, on application by the Commissioner of Competition, to prohibit dominant firms from engaging in anti-competitive practices, or to order such further remedial action as is reasonable and necessary to restore competition in the market.
On March 1, 2012, the Ontario Superior Court put an end to a deceptive marketing scam that had resulted in thousands of Canadians falling victim to false and misleading representations, to the tune of an estimated $7 million. In response to an application filed by the Commissioner of Competition, the court held that representations made to the public about a business directory service with a similar name and website to the well-established Yellow Pages business directory were false or misleading in a material respect, contrary to Section 74.01(1)(a) of the Competition Act. The court imposed an administrative monetary penalty (AMP) of $8 million on the related companies, and AMPs of $500,000 on each of the companies’ two principals. The court also ordered that restitution be paid to the individuals that had been victimized by the scam.
Playing on Canadians’ familiarity with the Yellow Pages business directory operated by the real Yellow Pages Group, the respondents had been marketing themselves under a similar name and offering online business directory services to Canadians since January 2010, leading many Canadians to believe that they were receiving communications from the established Yellow Pages Group. Through those communications, recipients were asked to “update” their existing records in order to obtain an additional free Google advertisement. A review of the fine print, however, revealed that it was actually an agreement to sign a new two-year contract for a fee of $2,856. If recipients did not respond and/or pay the requested fee, they were subsequently sent as many as three additional invoices, reminder notices or letters. The communications contained a logo similar to that of the real Yellow Pages Group, and referenced “Yellow Page” (no “s”) in large font. In reality, the communications were coming from companies and individuals that were in no way related to Yellow Pages Group or its business directory service.
The Court of Queen’s Bench in Albertahas recently ruled in 321665 Alberta Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Canada Ltd, on several issues relating to costs under section 36 of the Competition Act. The ruling follows an award of damages in a civil case involving a rare buyer-side conspiracy, brought under the pre-2009 section 45 of the Act.
By way of background, section 36 of the Competition Act provides a statutory cause of action to any person who has suffered loss or damage arising from the breach of any of the criminal provisions in Part VI of the Act. These criminal provisions include conspiracy, bid-rigging, misleading advertising, and deceptive telemarketing.
On February 17, the Competition Bureau announced that three construction companies—Construction G.T.R.L. (1990) Inc., Acoustique JCG Inc., and Entreprises de Construction OPC Inc.—have pled guilty to charges of bid-rigging in a construction project involving the expansion of the Chicoutimi hospital. The case comes less than half a year after a similar bid-rigging scheme involving ventilation companies in Montreal was uncovered and prosecuted, resulting in the imposition of a substantial fine and a prohibition order.
On February 6, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that as part of its efforts to increase transparency in the merger review process it will begin publishing monthly reports of concluded mergers. The first report, for the month of February, will be published in March and will appear as a table with information on the parties to the transaction, the industry, and the result (i.e. whether the merger was concluded following the issuance of an Advanced Ruling Certificate (ARC) under section 102 of the Competition Act, the issuance of a “No-action Letter”, the registration of a consent agreement, or a judicial decision).
The Bureau’s decision to publish a list of completed merger reviews comes after its previously announced decision to discontinue issuing detailed backgrounders on the facts of particular cases. Such backgrounders had been sporadic, and subject to permission by the parties to reveal non-public information, but had been helpful in shedding light on the Bureau’s enforcement approach to mergers – no such details of individual cases will be provided in the merger register.
On February 1, 2011, the Competition Bureau issued a statement in respect of the proposed acquisition of CTVglobemedia Inc. by BCE Inc. The statement noted that the Bureau was “cognizant of the growing trend toward vertical integration in the broadcasting industry” and that it was reviewing issues of vertical foreclosure. The statement also noted that the Commissioner of Competition would “closely monitor” the CRTC’s vertical integration hearings and subsequent regulatory developments in that same regard.
On September 21, 2011, the CRTC released its decision, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-601, setting out a regulatory framework for vertical integration among broadcasting and programming companies. In its decision, the CRTC imposes a number of restrictions on the activities of “vertically integrated” companies, which for the purposes of the decision it defines as companies that control both programming services (such as conventional television stations) and distribution services (such as cable or satellite systems). More specifically, some of the restrictions imposed by the decision include:
In a recent decision, the Competition Tribunal granted the Commissioner of Competition’s motion requesting that the Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) produce complete versions of a number of documents, including several that had previously been produced in a redacted form. The motion was part of the Commissioner’s proceedings against Visa Canada and Mastercard International under the Competition Act’s civil resale price maintenance (RPM) provision, enacted as part of the substantial amendments to the Competition Act in 2009. TD was granted leave to intervene in that proceeding in respect of a number of issues earlier this year.
The motion stemmed from the redaction by TD of certain documents produced by it in response to the Tribunal’s order granting it leave to intervene, which also ordered it to produce documents relative to the issues within the scope of its intervention. TD submitted that redactions are permitted if information is irrelevant and confidential, or if it is contained in an irrelevant portion of a segmented document. The Tribunal rejected this view, and held that, as a general rule, irrelevant portions of otherwise relevant documents must be disclosed. After reviewing relevant jurisprudence, the Tribunal held that redaction is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the redacted information is embarrassing or harmful or where there is an “enormous” volume of redacted material.
In a recent ruling, Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice explored the principles underlying the law respecting sealing orders and its application to reviewable matters under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act. On a motion by the Commissioner of Competition, the Court issued a partial confidentiality (or sealing) order with respect to certain information used by the Commissioner in her application against Rogers Communications Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Chatr Wireless Inc., for alleged misleading advertising. Information about “dropped call” rates, which the Court characterized as being at the “very heart” of the Commissioner’s application, was excluded from the sealing order after the Court determined that it was essential for that aspect of the proceedings to remain transparent.
Investigation into Misleading Advertising
The application to which the confidentiality order relates originated in November, 2010, when the Competition Bureau commenced legal proceedings against Rogers and Chatr. The Bureau’s application came after complaints were made by competing discount wireless carriers, Wind Mobile and Mobilicity, alleging that Rogers’ Chatr discount brand was misleading consumers into believing that its network was more reliable and had fewer “dropped calls” than those of other discount carriers.
On October 6, 2011, the Competition Bureau announced the publication of the final version of its revised Merger Enforcement Guidelines(MEGs), only thirteen months after announcing its intention to review the guidelines in September 2010. The revised MEGs replace both the 2004 version of the guidelines and the Bureau’s 2009 Efficiencies in Merger Review bulletin.
The revisions aim to better describe the Bureau’s analytical approach to merger review by addressing discrete areas where the 2004 MEGs no longer fully reflected Bureau practice or current economic and legal thinking. It is generally understood that the 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines(U.S. Guidelines) also constituted an important factor driving the need for review. Whereas the U.S. Guidelines are limited to horizontal mergers, however, the revised MEGs also address vertical merger analysis and go further than the U.S. Guidelines with respect to horizontal merger analysis by incorporating more recent thinking on Canada’s own unique efficiencies defence.
On October 5, 2011, the Competition Bureau released a “Position Statement” summarizing its approach in reviewing Canadian Tire’s recent acquisition of the Forzani Group.The transaction, which took the form of a takeover bid, was announced on May 9, 2011, and the Bureau cleared the transaction on August 3, 2011.The transaction provided the Bureau with the relatively rare opportunity to review a retail merger between retailers carrying on business using different business models: Forzani is a national sporting goods retailer (including sports apparel and equipment), and Canadian Tire is a mass merchandiser selling products, through a network of independent dealers, across a range of categories, including sporting goods as well as automotive parts, tools, house wares and electronics.
In reviewing the transaction, the Position Statement notes that the Bureau analysed its potential competitive effects in a number of possible product markets (retail sale of sporting equipment; retail sale of certain sporting equipment categories, such as hockey equipment; and the retail sale of specific sporting equipment products, such as hockey skates), but ultimately concluded that it was not necessary to conclusively define the relevant product market(s) in light of econometric evidence showing that neither party responded competitively to the presence of the other in local markets, and to evidence that this was unlikely to change post-merger. To our knowledge, this is the first time the Bureau has expressly relied on such a competitive effects analysis in its assessment of a merger, although the potential for such an approach was signalled in its draft revisions to the Merger Enforcement Guidelines, published earlier in 2011.
On September 22, 2011, the Competition Bureau (the Bureau) announced that charges had been laid against five individuals and four Montreal-based companies involved in an allegedly fraudulent telemarketing operation. According to the Bureau’s Backgrounder, the companies hired telemarketers to contact businesses and falsely suggest (i) that the telemarketers were regular suppliers of the businesses looking to obtain renewals for services; (ii) that purchases of medical kits were required to comply with new legislation; (iii) that an order had already been pre-authorized by someone else in the business; or (iv) that the purpose of the telemarketer’s call was to verify an address when in fact it was to obtain an order confirmation. The companies allegedly sold products which were inflated up to ten times the market value, and threatened collection actions against businesses when they refused to pay.
Based in Montreal, the telemarketing operation had allegedly targeted businesses in Canada, the United States, Europe and Central America since at least 2001. The accused individuals and companies are charged with deceptive telemarketing and misleading representations (both criminal offences) under the Competition Act, and fraud under the Criminal Code. Last year, in remarks made to the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, the Commissioner of Competition remarked that “[i]t is now clear that victims do not need to be Canadian in order for [the Bureau] to take action. This is an important step forward in the international fight against fraud.”
On September 2, 2011, the Competition Bureau released the results of an ex-post assessment of its December 2007 study entitled “Self-Regulated Professions: Balancing Competition and Regulation.”The Bureau’s review assessed developments since the publication of its 2007 study, which contained 53 recommendations aimed at eliminating unwarranted regulatory restrictions on competition in five self-regulating professions: accountants, lawyers, optometrists, pharmacists and real estate agents.
In addition to specific recommendations, the 2007 study also included six guiding principles set forth by the Bureau to help regulators develop regulatory frameworks that maximize consumer welfare through competition:
Regulation should have clearly defined and specific objectives.
Restrictions should be directly linked to clear and verifiable outcomes.
Regulation should be the minimum necessary to achieve stated objectives.
The regulatory process must be impartial and not self-serving.
A regulatory scheme should allow for periodic assessment of its effectiveness and be subject to regular reviews.
A primary objective of the regulatory framework should be to promote open and effectively competitive markets.
The Competition Bureau announced last week that it has entered into a Consent Agreement with Beiersdorf Canada Inc., the Canadian distributor of Nivea, regarding misleading claims associated with Nivea's "My Silhouette" product. According to the Competition Bureau, certain claims about the product, including that it can slim and reshape the body and cause a reduction of up to three centimetres on targeted areas, were false or misleading, and not based on adequate and proper testing. As part of the settlement, Beiersdorf has agreed to pay an administrative penalty of $300,000 plus $80,000 in costs, in addition to providing refunds to consumers.
The settlement follows on the heels of another high profile misleading advertising decision by the Commissioner of Competition pertaining to Bell Canada, which we described in a post of July 29. In that decision, the Commissioner concluded that Bell had misled consumers in its advertising regarding the prices consumers are required to pay for its TV, internet, home phone and wireless services. Bell Canada agreed to pay an administrative monetary penalty of $10 million, as well as revise its current and future advertising to ensure that consumers are no longer misled by the prices advertised and the fine-print disclaimers that accompany the advertising.
Given the recent activity by the Commissioner to exercise her powers under the Competition Act to crack down on misleading advertising, and further, given the steep penalties that can be imposed under the Act on companies found to have engaged in deceptive marketing ($10 million initially for a corporation and $15 million for repeat offenders), companies should take the time to carefully review their advertising and disclaimers prior to going to print, in order to ensure representations made to the public do not run afoul of the Act.
If you have any questions about the misleading advertising or other provisions of the Competition Act, I invite you to contact me or any other member of our Competition & Foreign Investment Group.
On August 8, 2011, the Competition Bureau provided guidance regarding the standard language parties can expect to see in standard “no action” letters issued in the context of merger reviews.
The Bureau’s approach better aligns the default language in no action letters with subsection 123(2) of the Competition Act and will no longer refer to the sufficiency of grounds to challenge. After September 1, 2011, “no action” letters will specify that:
“…the Commissioner does not, at this time, intend to make an application under section 92 in respect of the proposed transaction.”
For years, there has been a disconnect between the requirements of section 123 of the Competition Act for early termination of the initial 30-day waiting period under subsection 123(2) of the Act and the language actually used in “no action” letters, which granted such early termination, but mimicked the language used in advance ruling certificates issued under section 102 of the Act. The Bureau’s new standard language, while not changing the intended meaning of “no action” letters, aligns “no action” letters with the statutory requirements.
On August 11, 2011 the Competition Bureau (Bureau) released a summary of an internal study on the efficacy of remedies obtained under the merger provisions of the Competition Act. The study examined the efficacy of the Bureau’s policies and procedures on merger remedies for the years 1995-2005. In particular, the survey focused on 23 merger cases in which different remedial measures were implemented over the ten-year period. The Bureau interviewed different stakeholders in the merger review process, including merged entities, customers and purchasers of divested assets, as well as third parties affected by the remedy. The study utilized 135 interviews, approximately 50% of which were responses from customers.
The Competition Act allows for the Commissioner of Competition to make an application to the Competition Tribunal preventing a merging entity, alone or in combination with others, from having the ability to exercise market power as a result of its merger. The Commissioner can challenge the merger under section 92 of the Act, or seek to resolve the competition concerns by negotiating remedies with the merging parties. In practise, very few merger cases in Canada are litigated. Accordingly all of the remedies examined had been agreed with the parties. The Bureau’s 2006 Bulletin on Merger Remedies specifies four types of remedial measures used by the Bureau and the Tribunal to address mergers that have, or are likely to have, detrimental effects on competition. The study, which will be used to validate and refine certain aspects of the Bureau’s practice, describes key observations on the four principal remedies currently used by the Bureau, including: structural remedies, quasi-structural remedies, combination remedies, and stand-alone behavioural remedies. For purposes of the public summary of the report, however (details of the complete study must remain confidential pursuant to the confidentiality provisions of section 29 of the Competition Act), results have been summarized for structural, and for all other categories.
The Competition Bureau announced on July 28, 2011 that it had filed an action against five companies (Yellow Business Marketing Ltd. in Canada; Yellow Publishing Ltd. and Yellow Data Services Ltd. in the UK; Yellow Page Marketing B.V. in the Netherlands, and Backoffice Support SL in Spain) and three individuals (Brandon Marsh, manager of Yellow Business Marketing Ltd. and Jan Marks and Steve Green, Spanish residents) with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in connection with a deceptive marketing scheme targeting businesses in Canada.
"We are committed to cracking down on fraud that victimizes consumers and businesses. Significantly, the action we are taking today underscores the importance of working with our international partners to frustrate these types of multi-jurisdictional scams." said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition.
Les Entreprises Promécanic Ltée (Promécanic), a ventilation company based in Laval, Québec, has pleaded guilty to three criminal charges of bid-rigging for tenders issued by its contractors in 2004 and 2005. On July 19, 2011, Promécanic was fined C$425,000 by the Superior Court of Québec for participating in agreements to fix the outcome of bids for the installation of residential ventilation systems in Montreal.
In December, 2010, the Competition Bureau’s investigation of eight ventilation systems companies culminated in the laying of criminal charges for bid-rigging against Promécanic and seven others. Bid-rigging, which is defined in section 47 of the Competition Act, prohibits bidders from entering into an agreement not to submit bids or to submit pre-arranged bids when responding to a bid or tender call. The criminal sanction under section 47 applies if the person calling for the bids is not made aware of the agreement at or before the time when the bid or tender is submitted or withdrawn. In this case, the Bureau’s investigation found evidence of collusion among the eight ventilation companies in five separate competitive bidding processes valued at approximately C$8 million. The maximum penalties for bid-rigging include a fine that is at the discretion of the court and/or a prison term not exceeding 14 years.
On June 28, 2011, Bell Canada entered into a Consent Agreement with the Commissioner of Competition that will require Bell to pay a $10-million administrative monetary penalty for making false or misleading representations in its advertising regarding the prices consumers are required to pay for its Home Phone, Internet, Television, and Wireless services.
Upon completion of its investigation, the Competition Bureau concluded that Bell has, since December 2007, advertised monthly prices which were lower than the actual price it charges consumers for its services. Section 74.01 of the Competition Actprohibits any representation to the public, for the purposes of promoting a product, that is false or misleading in a material respect, and takes into account both the general impression conveyed by a representation as well as its literal meaning.
On May 18, 2011, the Competition Bureau released a new Fee and Service Standards Handbook for Written Opinions with updated guidance on required information, service times, and fees for binding written opinions. Section 124.1 of Canada’s Competition Act, which was added in 2002, gives the Commissioner the ability to issue a written opinion as to whether particular provisions of the Act would apply to the facts described in the application. These opinions are binding upon the Commissioner provided that all material facts have been disclosed.
The Bureau’s new Handbook aims to assist applicants in determining what material facts need to be disclosed. It provides non-exhaustive lists of required information for some of the most frequently reviewed provisions, including: s. 76 (price maintenance), ss. 77 to 79 (other civil reviewable practices including abuse of dominance), s. 90.1 (non-criminal agreements with competitors that substantially lessen or prevent competition), s. 45 (cartels, i.e., criminal competitor agreements), s.52 (misleading advertising), s. 52.1 (deceptive telemarketing), s. 53 (deceptive notice of winning a prize), and ss. 74.01 to 74.06 (civil deceptive marketing practices). The new Handbook reflects some recent changes to the Act, such as the addition of s. 90.1 and the corresponding “per se” nature of the cartel offence. It also makes some changes to the information required for certain provisions. For example, requests for written opinion for s. 45 and ss. 77 to 79 now require the submission of “any relevant agreement(s)”, a requirement not stipulated in the previous Handbook.
On February 24, 2011, the Commissioner of Competition announced that the Competition Bureau will undertake “moderate revisions” to the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs). This announcement follows a series of roundtable consultations with competition law practitioners across Canada, consultations with foreign agencies and an internal Bureau review. A wide variety of opinions were expressed during these roundtable consultations, including opinions as to whether revisions were necessary, particularly given that the MEGs were last revised in 2004 following a thorough review and consultation process. In this regard, an important factor driving the revisions is generally believed to be the 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (although these had last been revised in 1992).
The Competition Bureau announced today that the threshold for the size of the assets or revenues of the "target" of acquisitions involving businesses in Canada will increase to $73 million. The change will take place following publication in the Canada Gazette, which is expected to take place on February 12, 2011. Generally speaking, transactions involving parties whose combined assets in Canada or revenues in, from or into Canada (including those of affiliates) exceeds C$400 million must be notified in advance of closing to the Competition Bureau, if the business in Canada has assets in Canada or revenues generated therefrom exceeding the "size of target" threshold. This threshold may be modified annually under the indexing provisions of the Competition Act.
On January 26, 2011, Canada’s Competition Bureau announced that it has applied to the Competition Tribunal for an order to dissolve CCS Corporation’s acquisition of Complete Environmental Inc., which owns the Babkirk Secure Landfill located in northeastern British Columbia. Interestingly, the theory of harm in this case is founded on a likely “prevention” rather than a “lessening” of competition – typically harder to prove.
CCS’ acquisition of the Babkirk Secure Landfill is said to be likely to substantially prevent competition for the disposal of hazardous waste produced largely at oil and gas facilities in northeastern British Columbia. According to the Commissioner of Competition: “[b]y purchasing, rather than face competing with the Babkirk Secure Landfill, CCS will prevent the entry of competition into the market for secure hazardous waste disposal in Northeastern British Columbia.” Complete Environmental had received regulatory approval to open the landfill in February 2010, but had not yet started construction. According to the Bureau, had the Babkirk Secure Landfill opened, it would have become a competitor to CCS, which currently operates the only two operational secure landfills for hazardous waste in British Columbia.
An article in the Globe and Mail considers whether enhancements to the Competition Bureau's enforcement tools have led to more aggressive scrutiny of corporate mergers in Canada. Some in the legal community see an increase in the Competition Bureau's demands for remedies emerging from the Bureau's ability, since 2009, to request additional documents and information from merging parties without having to obtain court approval, and to extend waiting periods while such requests are complied with. Others, however, disagree that the Bureau's substantive approach to merger review has been affected by the enhanced investigative powers. According to the head of Stikeman Elliott's Competition Law practice group, Lawson Hunter, who was quoted in the article,
I don’t see any evidence that the bureau is getting more aggressive in how they are analyzing mergers because of these changes at all.
The Guidelines [the Bureau's Merger Review Process Guidelines, which explain the Bureau's approach to administering Canada's merger review process] also emphasized our commitment to use our new information gathering powers judiciously, only in respect of those transactions that raise significant competition issues and for which the Bureau requires additional information to conduct a sufficiently thorough review.
Since the introduction of the amendments in 2009, the Bureau has issued only ten SIRs [Supplementary Information Requests, also called "second requests" in the United States]. To put this into perspective, the Bureau has received more than 300 merger filings over this same period, approximately 90% of which were cleared within the initial 30-day review period.
This past weekend, the UK's Guardian published an interesting article on the practice of celebrity endorsements on social networking sites like Twitter. As described by the Guardian, the Office of Fair Trading, the UK's consumer and competition authority, investigated a media company last year that engaged in remunerating individuals that published online content promoting the company's clients. At issue was the fact that the content was published "without sufficient disclosures in place to make it clearly identifiable to consumers that the promotions had been paid for." In the United States, the Federal Trade Commissionsuggested last year that the disclosure of sponsored tweets be made using a hashtag like #paid or #ad.
In Canada, a spokesman for The Competition Bureau said that promoted tweets in Canada must conform to existing Canadian advertising legislation.
Anyone endorsing a product must actually use the product and their opinion of the product must not have changed, he said. However, Canadian law does not have any specific laws governing the use of promoted tweets on Twitter.
Some of the most rapidly-evolving issues facing Canadian businesses concern the increasingly-complex labyrinth of advertising regulations, anti-spam legislation, privacy issues and the rise of competition law-related class action lawsuits. Companies must remain on top of the latest developments in these areas in order to effectively manage their risk. The webcast of a recent seminar hosted by Stikeman Elliott LLP, which featured panellists from the Competition Bureau and members of the firm's Competition/Antitrust Group, is now available on-line. Printed materials are also available.
The Competition Bureau of Canada announced on December 15, 2010 that it had filed an application with the Competition Tribunal to strike down certain rules that Visa and MasterCard impose on merchants who accept their credit cards. The Bureau is challenging Visa and MasterCard's rules under the price maintenance provisions of the Competition Act. The Bureau launched its investigation in response to complaints by merchants and their associations and initiated a formal inquiry in April 2009. It marks the second civil case launched by the Commissioner in the past year challenging unilateral conduct - a significant increase in the pace of enforcement of the reviewable practice provisions of the Competition Act, if it persists, although the case has taken almost two years to come to fruition.
Currently, the Commissioner's extensive investigative powers can only be used in relation to an "inquiry" which requires that grounds exist for believing either than an offence has been committed under the criminal provisions of the Competition Act, or that grounds exist for the Tribunal to make an order under one of the civil provisions of the Act. There is no explicit power for the Commissioner to inquire into the state of competition in an industry, absent allegations of wrong-doing under the Act. A predecessor to the Competition Bureau, the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, made extensive use of sector inquiry powers under the Combines Investigation Act, most notably inquiring into competition in the oil and gas sector for over ten years, between 1973 and 1985, while ultimately failing to find any evidence of wrongdoing. In 2000, Industry Canada and Natural Resources Canada jointly sponsored an independent review of the sector by the Conference Board of Canada, which again found the industry to be reasonably competitive. In response to the introduction by a Private Member of Bill C-452, the grounds for which again focus on competition in relation to gasoline prices, the Competition Bureau has said that it does not need the extra powers.
As of November 1, 2010, new internal processing deadlines apply to Canadian merger review by the Competition Bureau, pursuant to the release of the Fees and Service Standards Handbook for Mergers and Merger-Related Matters. The Handbook’s release followed the release of a draft handbook in May, 2010 and extensive public consultations. A key purpose of the new Handbook is to better align the Bureau’s own (non-binding) internal timelines for processing merger files (so-called “service standards”) with the statutory waiting periods.
At the same time, in a related Procedures Guide for Notifiable Transactions and Advance Ruling Certificates, the Bureau has clarified that electronic merger notifications will now only be accepted between 9 am and 5 pm Eastern Time on business days for same-day receipt (the Bureau had previously accepted paper filings until 5:00 pm, but electronic filings until midnight for same-day receipt), and waiting periods that end on a weekend or other statutory holiday in the province of Quebec will be extended to expire on the next business day.
On October 5, 2010, the Competition Bureau announced that it has approved the divestiture of waste collection assets of BFI Canada Inc. in Calgary, Ottawa and Edmonton. The divestitures were announced as a remedy in relation to the merger of IESI-BFC Ltd. (BFI) and Waste Services Inc. on June 29, 2010. In each city, there was a different buyer, illustrating that in transactions involving smaller geographic markets, different buyers in each market may be acceptable. Divestitures in other cities are still required under the terms of the consent agreement.
The Competition Bureau announced on August 13 that it will not challenge the proposed acquisition of the over-the-air and specialty television businesses of Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Canwest) by Shaw Communications Inc. (Shaw). According to the Bureau, the transaction would not likely give rise to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, being the statutory test for a merger challenge under the Competition Act. The Bureau based its conclusion on a number of factors, including effective remaining competition, the effect of the regulatory environment and a lack of relevant competitive concerns on the part of market participants. Concerns from market participants are typically a very important factor in the Bureau's assessment of the competitive impact of a transaction. In terms of the transaction's potential impact on advertising, the Bureau found that there were numerous alternative options available to advertisers. The transaction remains subject to CRTC approval.
On March 19, 2010, the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld a decision rendered by the Quebec Superior Court, unconditionally absolving Mr. Daniel Drouin, the accused, of a price-fixing charge. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s application for leave to appeal on the basis that the lower court judge had not made a reviewable error which would merit judicial review.
In the original Superior Court decision, the court had ordered an absolute discharge. The accused had pleaded guilty to a charge brought against him for fixing the price of gas in the city of Victoriaville in 2005, when he was the supervisor of Les Pétroles Cadrin Inc. In his capacity as supervisor, the accused was responsible for setting the price of gas sold by the service station. The price-fixing charge was brought against the accused following an investigation by the Competition Bureau.
The Competition Bureau today announced new criminal charges against 25 individuals and three companies with respect to alleged price fixing in Québec and stated that other investigations with respect to alleged price fixing in retail gasoline outside of Québec were ongoing. Among other things, the bureau used wiretaps in its investigation.
The bureau stated in a backgrounder that: “[w]hile some of the accused operated under the name or "banner" of a major oil company, it was the local operators of the gas stations who were responsible for setting the final price at the pump. There is no evidence that the three major national oil companies' corporate offices were involved in these offences.”
The bureau acknowledged that: “[s]imilar gasoline prices, or similar changes in the price of gasoline, do not necessarily indicate price-fixing. High prices are a concern under the Competition Act only when they are the result of anti-competitive conduct, such as price-fixing.”
The accused are presumed to be innocent and are entitled to all of the rights and defences provided by law including a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal.
On June 29, 2010, the Competition Bureau announced that Zellers Inc. agreed to take steps to address the Bureau's position that a Zellers' savings card promotion violated the Competition Act. The Bureau stated that Zellers promoted the savings cards, valued at $10, with the purchase of the movie Avatar on DVD or Blu-Ray and that one of the conditions associated with the savings card was a $50 minimum purchase in order to redeem the savings card. The Bureau claimed that this condition was omitted from the advertising for the promotion and only disclosed after consumers made their initial purchase.
The steps to be taken by Zellers to resolve the Bureau's concerns are as follows:
Customers who present a $10 savings card, or a sales receipt for the movie Avatar purchased between April 22 and 24, 2010, will receive a $10 credit with no minimum purchase required;
The redemption period will be extended to August 6, 2010;
Zellers will bring these changes to the attention of consumers through in-store signage and a notice posted on their Web site; and
Two corrective notices will be published in major Canadian newspapers, and Zellers will advertise the details of the redemption in flyers.
On June 29, 2010, the Competition Bureau announced that it had negotiated a merger remedy in connection with the IESI-BFC Ltd. (BFI) and Waste Services Inc. (WSI) transaction. The remedy is set out in a Consent Agreement filed with the Competition Tribunal. The divestiture will include commercial front end (as opposed to roll off bin) waste collection assets, including customer contracts, vehicles, bins and other equipment in Calgary, Edmonton, Hamilton, Ottawa and Simcoe County, Ontario as well as a waste transfer station located in Hamilton, Ontario.
The Consent Agreement includes specific provisions regarding national accounts, unassignable contracts and the prospect of different buyers in the various markets.
On May 25, 2010, the Quebec Superior Court acquitted Electromega Limited (Electromega), a traffic lights manufacturer, of a bid-rigging charge relating to the supply of LED traffic lights in Quebec.
Prior to the trial, Electromega had brought an application for a stay of proceedings on the basis that the death of its president in September 2009 deprived it of an essential witness and therefore a right to a fair and public hearing pursuant to paragraph 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court concluded that Electromega had not proven that the missing evidence created a prejudice of such magnitude that it amounted to a deprivation of the opportunity to make full answer and defence. Consequently, Electromega’s application was dismissed. However, at trial, the case was dismissed on the basis that the Crown had failed to prove an agreement.
The facts in issue arose in July 2004, when the city of Quebec solicited bids for the supply of LED traffic signals sourced by Gelcore (distributed in Quebec by Electromega), or Dialight (distributed by Tassimco Technologies Inc. (Tassimco)).
Building on extensive institutional leadership and expertise, three important positions have recently been filled in the Mergers Branch of the Competition Bureau. Leading the Mergers Branch, Paul Collins has recently been appointed Senior Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Mergers. Mr. Collins has extensive experience from his many years as a highly regarded competition law advisor in the competition bar in Toronto. Mr. Collins is second-in-command at the Bureau, reporting directly to the Commissioner of Competition, Melanie Aitken.
The Mergers Branch includes three divisions and the Merger Notification Unit, the heads of which report to Mr. Collins. Ann Wallwork has been Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Competition for Division A for a number of years, and also assumed the role of Acting Senior Deputy Commissioner of Mergers between December 2009 and May 2010.
In the text of a May 4, 2010 speech that was released by the Competition Bureau on June 7, 2010, the Commissioner of Competition, Melanie Aitken, has affirmed the guidance in the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines regarding the care with which she will proceed under the cartel provision (section 45 of the Competition Act). The Commissioner said: “[l]et me be crystal clear: if an agreement among competitors does not constitute a naked agreement to fix prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, that agreement will be subject to – at most, and only – a separate, civil review requiring proof of economic harm.”
The Commissioner also confirmed the written guidance that certain types of agreements will not be the subject of cartel prosecutions: “we have explicitly removed whole categories of agreements from the scope of criminal enforcement action, such as dual distribution agreements, franchise agreements and non–competes, unless, of course, the agreement is just a sham. We are doing our best to put a fence around the conduct we would consider investigating as criminal, and to paint that fence in bright, bold colours.”
These unequivocal statements of the Commissioner will be welcomed by businesses who are considering legitimate collaborative conduct which may raise issues under the new and potentially very broad cartel law. Still, it must be noted that the Commissioner’s guidance is not binding and will not remove the risk of private actions in which cartel conduct is alleged.
The Commissioner also discussed merger review issues and her case against the Canadian Real Estate Association in the May 4, 2010 speech.
On June 2, 2010, the Competition Bureau released a policy statement regarding its approach to the disclosure of information to companies involved in hostile transactions. Bidders and targets in hostile or unsolicited transactions can have competing interests, posing challenges for the Bureau when it comes to complying with its confidentiality obligations under the Competition Act. Although the Bureau has an explicit obligation to immediately notify a target of the date upon which the Bureau receives a pre-merger notification filing from the bidder, the Act does not otherwise address the issue of information sharing in the context of hostile or unsolicited transactions.
The Bureau's new policy statement sets out that when the Bureau provides to one party information regarding such matters as the anticipated duration of the Bureau review and its views on whether the transaction would substantially lessen or prevent competition, it will also “strive to disclose” that information “equitably” with the other party, subject to the restrictions in the Competition Act. There is therefore a stance favouring the sharing of information but which also recognizes that there will be limitations required by law in some cases.
On May 31, 2010, the Competition Bureau announced that Clean Harbours, Inc., a US-based company that provides environmental waste services in Canada, had implemented a merger remedy as required by the terms of its July 2009 agreement with the Commissioner of Competition. The agreement required the divestiture of the Pembina Area Landfill in Alberta which Clean Harbours had acquired as a result of its 2009 acquisition of Eveready Inc., an Alberta-based company that also provided environmental waste disposal services. In July 2009, the Bureau stated that it had concluded that Clean Harbours' acquisition of Eveready would likely prevent or lessen competition substantially in respect of Class I solid hazardous waste disposal in Alberta. In particular, the Bureau was concerned that the transaction “could result in higher prices for solid hazardous waste disposal” since Clean Harbours would have owned the only two Class I hazardous waste landfills in the province.
The landfill was sold to Secure Energy Services Inc. Although the Initial Sale Period (during which Clean Harbours would have conduct of sale) set out in the agreement is still confidential, it is possible that it was considerably shorter than the 10-month period it took to complete the divestiture. If so, the Commissioner may have agreed to one or more extensions of the Initial Sale Period so as to allow for the orderly sale of the business by Clean Harbours, rather than resorting to a forced sale by a divestiture trustee as provided for in the agreement if a sale was not completed by Clean Harbours within the Initial Sale Period.
On May 31, 2010, the Competition Bureau released for consultation a draft revised Fee and Service Standards Handbook for Merger-Related Matters. The Bureau proposes changes to timelines as well as some adjustments to the assessment of transaction complexity. Service standards are wholly distinct from statutory waiting period under the merger filing provisions of the Competition Act. They set out, depending on substantive complexity, non-binding maximum time periods within which the Bureau will endeavour to complete a merger review.
Merger reviews are designated as being either “non-complex”, “complex”, or “very complex”. The draft Handbook proposes:
the “non-complex” service standard period will remain at 14 days (practically speaking, there is probably not much room for a shorter period)
the “complex” service standard period will be reduced from 70 days to 60 days (this reflects the Bureau’s record of generally completing complex reviews in substantially less than 70 days)
the “very-complex” service standard period will also be reduced from 5 months to 120 days (reflecting the bureau’s overall success in completing reviews in less than 5 months but still a courageous move given the challenges that may be associated with such reviews)
the introduction of a new service standard period to apply where the Bureau issues a formal Supplementary Information Request (“SIR”) – the new period will be 30 days following the completion of the parties’ response to the SIR (a reasonably tight time line for the Bureau to impose on itself).
The Bureau will accept comments on the draft until July 31, 2010.
On May 31, 2010, the Competition Bureau released its Merger Review Performance Report which provides an update on the performance of the Bureau's Mergers Branch.
For the Bureau’s year of April 1, 2009 - March 31, 2010, the Bureau commenced a total of 216 merger reviews. Reviews were commenced after receiving merger notifications under Part IX of theCompetition Act or requests for advance ruling certificates under s. 102 of the Competition Act or for other reasons. Merger review numbers were slightly less than previous years. The Bureau commenced 239 merger reviews in the 2008 – 2009 year and 337 merger reviews in the 2007 – 2008 year (the highest number since at least the 2003 – 2004 year).
The Bureau also reported on the breakdown of complexity designations. In the 2009 – 2010 year the Bureau classified 173 transactions (84%) as non-complex (subject to a non-binding maximum 2 week review period), 27 transactions (13%) as complex (subject to a non-binding maximum 10 week review period), and 6 transactions (3%) as very complex (subject to a non-binding maximum 5 month review period). These results were generally in line with previous years. From 2003 to 2010, approximately 88% of merger reviews were classified as non-complex, 10% as complex and 2% as very complex.
The Bureau reported that in the 2008 – 2009 year it completed its merger reviews within the designated review period 93% of the time for non-complex transactions, 89% of the time for complex transactions and 83% of the time for very complex transactions. Thus, while exceptions do exist, overall the Bureau completes its merger reviews within the applicable review period in a high percentage of cases.
It is important to keep in mind that review periods are based on non-binding review periods set out in the Bureau’s Fee and Service Standards Handbook. These are wholly distinct from the statutory waiting periods set out in Part IX of the Competition Act.
Canada’s recent move to a stricter cartel law that does not require proof of market effect is considered to be a shift towards American cartel law, where hard core cartels receive per se treatment. The new Canadian law can raise complicated issues with respect to joint venture activities. It defines criminal cartels as agreements between “competitors” to engage in the activities of fixing price, allocating markets or controlling supply. These activities may also arise in the context of what would otherwise be considered legitimate joint ventures. Although the Commissioner’s Competitor Collaboration Guidelines indicate that the new parallel reviewable matter provision for agreements that substantially lessen or prevent competition is the preferred approach for the assessment of legitimate joint venture agreements, she nonetheless has the discretion to recommend that such agreements be subject to criminal prosecution. Private litigants may also bring private actions in respect of joint venture activities that they allege contravene the cartel provision.
On May 14, 2010, the Commissioner of Competition, Melanie Aitken, and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Brian Saunders, announced that they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU establishes the guiding principles of the relationship between the Competition Bureau and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC). Stakeholders now have a clearer understanding of the working relationship between the Bureau investigators and PPSC counsel, such as their respective roles and responsibilities at different stages of an investigation. The MOU was not intended to change the relationship between the two organizations, but to crystallize their existing relationship. This announcement continues the Bureau's policy of providing transparency where possible.
The Competition Bureau today clarified its enforcement approach with respect to the Bureau's revised Enforcement Guidelines for "Product of Canada" and "Made in Canada" Claims released in December 2009. The Guidelines will be an important resource for businesses who need to understand the Bureau's approach in assessing "Product of Canada" and "Made in Canada" claims for non-food products under the false or misleading representations provisions of the Competition Act, the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Actand the Textile Labelling Act. The Guidelines will take effect on July 1, 2010 and a six-month transitional period will follow. During this period, the Bureau states that it will only consider enforcement action in circumstances of bad faith. In other cases, the Bureau will limit its response to apparent non-compliance to education and warning letters.
Today,the Competition Bureau announced that Reitmans (Canada) Limited, a major Canadian clothing retailer, will modify a promotion, alleged to be misleading, offered by Smart Set, a division of Reitmans. The promotion in question consisted of a "Savings Pass" offered to customers of Smart Set. There were conditions associated with the redemption of the "Savings Pass" that the Bureau viewed as not being disclosed in Smart Set's in-store signage or Smart Set's Web site. The Bureau considered this to be contrary to the false or misleading representations provisions of the Competition Act.
The Competition Bureau announced today that Solvay Chemicals Inc. has been fined $2.5 million by the Federal Court after the company pleaded guilty to criminal charges for fixing the price of hydrogen peroxide sold in Canada. Solvay Chemicals Inc. is the second party to plead guilty in this alleged price-fixing conspiracy. The Bureau's investigation of other companies alleged to be participants in the conspiracy is ongoing.
The Competition Bureau announced today that it has reached an agreement with Danaher Corporation to resolve its concerns with respect to Danaher's acquisition of MDS Inc.'s Analytical Technologies business. Danaher has also signed a consent decree with the United States Federal Trade Commission, which the Bureau determined was sufficient to adequately resolve competition concerns in Canada.
Pursuant to the U.S. decree, Danaher agreed to a divestiture of MDS's Arcturus brand of laser microdissection (LMD) instruments, reagents and consumables to Life Technologies Corporation. The divestiture package includes all relevant Canadian intellectual property rights relating to Arcturus LMD instruments in Canada.
The Competition Bureauannounced today that more than 450,000 textile articles have been re-labelled and over 250 Web pages corrected as a result of the Bureau's efforts to ensure that textile articles derived from bamboo are accurately labelled and advertised. The Bureau took this initiative because of concerns over potentially misleading labelling and advertising in the marketplace with respect to textile articles labelled "bamboo".
Today the Competition Bureau announced that Tassimco Technologies Canada Inc.has pleaded guilty before the Superior Court of Quebec to a bid-rigging charge in respect of the sale and supply of light emitting diode modules for traffic signals. The company was fined $50,000 and is subject to a court order requiring the implementation of a corporate compliance program and the education of employees about bid-rigging and conspiracy offences under the Competition Act.
The Competition Bureau announced today that it has reached a consent agreement with Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc. and Live Nation, Inc. that resolves the Bureau's concerns about their proposed merger. The agreement requires divestitures by Ticketmaster to facilitate competition in the ticketing services market. It also requires Ticketmaster to sell its Paciolan ticketing business and to licence its ticketing system for use by a third party event promoter. The consent agreement also contains some behavioural provisions.
The Competition Bureau announced today that it has entered into consent agreements with two Canadian hot tub retailers, Polar Spas (Edmonton) Ltd. and Sleepwise Inc., regarding claims that certain hot tub products were associated with the ENERGY STAR Program.
On September 21, 2009, the Competition Bureau released its Enforcement Guidelines on Consumer Rebate Promotions. These Guidelines set out the Bureau's (non-binding) interpretation of both the criminal and the civil provisions relating to false or misleading representations under the Competition Act, the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, and the Textile Labelling Act as applied to consumer rebate promotions, and include examples of recommended best practices.
On June 18, 2009, the Minister of Justice tabled a new statute, Bill C-46, also known as the Investigative Powersfor the 21st Century Act, proposing amendments to the Criminal Code, the Mutual Legal Assistance inCriminal Matters Act, and the Competition Act. The stated purpose of the new Bill, which has received first reading in Parliament, is to enhance the investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in order that they may keep pace with modern communications technologies. Amendments to the Criminal Code are intended to give investigators better tools to perform complex investigations into communications that have occurred over the Internet and/or electronic communication networks. Among other things, Bill C-46 will create a new concept of "transmission data," and extend investigative powers currently restricted to telephone data to all means of telecommunications. The Bill will enhance the power of investigators to seek court orders to compel the production of data with respect to the transmission of communications, and the location of transactions and individuals. Government investigators will also be given powers to seek orders for the preservation of electronic evidence and warrants to help track transactions and individuals.
Commissioner of Competition Sheridan Scott announced in December that she was stepping down as Commissioner of Competition, head of Canada's competition enforcement agency, the Competition Bureau - to enter private practice. The Government has announced that Melanie Aitken, previously Senior Deputy Commissioner, Mergers Branch has taken over as Interim Commissioner. Adam Fanaki, a former private competition law practitioner who has been Special Counsel to the Commissioner for the past two years, takes over as Acting Senior Deputy Commissioner, Mergers Branch.
The original information bulletin was issued by the Bureau in 1997, and the updated version largely elaborates on the principles set out in the original, but with some notable changes. In particular, the revised bulletin has been expanded to include a template compliance program, a template "certification letter" for execution by employees following training, and a "due diligence checklist" for senior management. Although the revised bulletin has no legal effect and is not binding on the Bureau, it provides businesses with guidance as to the elements of a credible and effective corporate compliance program - which could prove important in the Bureau's consideration of a recommendation for leniency or alternative resolutions, should prosecution under the Competition Act nonetheless become a possibility.
On July 21, 2008, the Competition Bureau (Bureau) published its new Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines (New Guidelines), following the issuance of draft guidelines in October, 2007 and a period of public consultation.1 The New Guidelines supersede all previous statements of the Bureau and the Commissioner of Competition on the subject.
On June 25, 2008 Canada's Competition Bureau (Bureau) released Environmental Claims: A guide for industry and advertisers (Environmental Claims Guide or Guide), its new environmental claims guidance document produced in partnership with the Canadian Standards Association (CSA).
The Environmental Claims Guide is meant to provide industry and advertisers with best-practices guidance for compliance with the prohibitions against false or misleading advertising in Canada's Competition Act, Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act and Textile Labelling Act, in addition to providing industry with a guide to the application of the CAN/CSA-ISO 14021, Environmental labels and declarations - Self-declared environmental claims (Type 11 environmental labelling) regulations.1
The Competition Bureau also recently issued a Draft Information Bulletin on Sentencing and Leniency in Cartel Cases for public consultation.1 The Bulletin sets out the factors that the Commissioner of Competition and the Bureau will consider in making recommendations to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that those accused of criminal cartel and bid-rigging offences under the Competition Act2should be treated leniently in sentencing.
The Bureau's goal is to establish a transparent and predictable Leniency Program to complement the Bureau's existing Immunity Program. Under the Immunity Program, full immunity from prosecution is available, subject to certain conditions, to the first business organization or individual that comes forward to assist the Bureau with an investigation into the activities of a cartel or bid-rigging scheme - in other words, full immunity is available to the "first in."
In the past parties who co-operated with the Bureau's investigations in a timely and valuable way have also qualified for lenient treatment in sentencing. The formal Leniency Program clarifies the terms on which leniency will be made available in the future, on the expectation that parties will then be more likely to come forward and cooperate with investigations.
The Bulletin is divided into three parts. The introduction provides an overview of how the Bureau, the Act and the cartel provisions operate, and the respective roles of the Commissioner of Competition, the DPP and the Courts in enforcing the Act. The second part of the Bulletin sets out the general principles of sentencing that the Courts will consider, and which the Bureau therefore considers in the course of making sentencing recommendations. The third part of the Bulletin describes the more specific terms on which the Bureau will recommend a reduced sentence for participants in the Leniency Program as a result of cooperation and assistance during the investigation. This article focuses on the second and third parts of the Bulletin.
The Competition Bureau recently published its Information Bulletin on Sections 15 and 16 of the Competition Act, which sets out the Bureau's practices and policies under the Competition Act's search warrant provisions and related powers for the search of computer systems. The Bulletin sets out what persons or businesses should expect from the Bureau during a search and with respect to the handling of any "records or other things" seized as a result of the search.
Although unable to provide for all eventualities, in our view the Bulletin provides general insight into the Bureau's approach to section 15 search warrants and the related use of computer systems. The Bulletin does not, however, reveal any material changes in the search procedures utilized by the Bureau in recent years.
On March 31, 2008 the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) issued a draft Information Bulletin entitled Multi-level Marketing and Scheme of Pyramid Selling, Sections 55 and 55.1 of the Competition Act. Once finalized, this bulletin will replace existing 1996 guidance on the same topic. Written comments on the draft Bulletin will be accepted by the Competition Bureau until June 30, 2008.
March 3, 2008: Brian Gover, a partner at Stockwoods LLP Barristers, a former criminal crown counsel and experienced trial lawyer, has been appointed to advise Sheridan Scott, Commissioner of Competition, and John Sims, Deputy Minister of Justice, on the Bureau's section 11 process.
In particular, he is to report on the standard of disclosure required in ex parte applications under s. 11 for orders for the production of documents and information under the Competition Act, and to make recommendations to assist in ensuring that the Competition Bureau makes adequate disclosure to the courts in ex parte section 11 proceedings.
The Bureau was roundly rebuked by the Federal Court in a January, 2008 decision setting aside section 11 orders issued by it in November, 2007 in the ongoing Labatt/Lakeport merger inquiry, saying that the information filed by the Commissioner had been "misleading, inaccurate and incomplete." For further detail see "Substantial disclosure obligations for production orders: Federal Court rebukes Commissioner" (The Competitor, February 11, 2008). Mr. Gover is to report by June.
On October 24, 2008, the Competition Bureau (the Bureau) released its draft Information Bulletin on Trade Associations (the Bulletin) for public comment.
According to the Bureau, participation in trade associations - particularly those whose members compete - carries with it an inherent risk that the association may be used as a forum for anti-competitive conduct, particularly anti-competitive agreements or collective action that violates the criminal conspiracy (cartel) provision of the Competition Act. "Association activities that deal with subjects such as pricing, customers, territories, market shares, terms of sales and advertising restrictions" are of particular concern to the Bureau. The draft Bulletin aims to provide guidance to trade associations on how best to ensure compliance with the Competition Act; it calls upon trade associations to "ensure that appropriate safeguards are implemented" to guard against anti-competitive conduct.
On January 28, 2008, at the request of Labatt Brewing Company Limited (Labatt), the Federal Court set aside its own order (of November 8, 2007) requiring Labatt to produce documents related to the Commissioner's ongoing investigation of the Labatt/Lakeport merger (the merger), which closed on March 29, 2007. The original order was obtained on an ex parte (without notice to Labatt) application by the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) under Section 11 of the Competition Act1 (the Act). The Court did so on the grounds that the disclosure made to secure the order was misleading, inaccurate and incomplete and, had complete disclosure been provided, the November 8, 2007 order would not have been granted (at least not on the terms on which it was granted). This most recent decision is just the latest in a series of decisions against the Commissioner respecting her investigation into the merger2 and raises a number of interesting questions about how this may affect the Competition Bureau's approach to formal investigations going forward.
On January 22, 2008, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the Commissioner of Competition in the Labatt/Lakeport merger, delivering its judgment from the bench, after having heard arguments only from the Commissioner's counsel.
The Tribunal decision
The appeal was from an order of the Competition Tribunal made on March 28, 2007, dismissing the Commissioner's application under s.100 of the Competition Act to delay closing of the acquisition of Lakeport Brewing Income Fund (Lakeport) by Labatt Brewing Company Limited (Labatt). This transaction closed on March 29, 2007. Shawn Neylan of Stikeman Elliott LLP led the competition team for Lakeport, supported by Michael Kilby. Litigation partner Katherine Kayargued the case for Lakeport at the Tribunal.
The determinative issue in the Tribunal's decision was whether the potential post-closing remedies of dissolution and divestiture could effectively remedy a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) assuming an SLC were later established, since at the time of the hearing the Commissioner had not concluded that there would be a SLC as a result of the transaction, but was requesting more time to complete her review. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner had not met the burden of establishing that closing would substantially impair the Tribunal's ability to remedy an SLC, and accordingly dismissed the Commissioner's application. The Tribunal pointed out that Canadian merger remedies need not restore the pre-merger situation (as in the U.S.), but need only restore competition to the point that there is no substantial lessening of competition, a point which the Tribunal's decision indicated that the Commissioner's evidence had not addressed.
Canada's Competition Bureau released its report, Self-regulated professions - Balancing competition and regulation (the Report) on December 11, 2007 (see www.competition.gc.ca). According to a recent study by the Conference Board of Canada, labour productivity of the professions in Canada is about half that of the professions in the United States. Citing an OECD report that identified decreasing regulation of the professions as one of five key ways to improve the future prosperity of Canada, the Bureau report has specific proposals for improvement.
On October 30, 2007 the federal government's Competition Policy Review Panel (CPRP) issued its consultation paper "Sharpening Canada's Competitive Edge" (the Consultation Paper). The government established the CPRP in the Spring of 2007 to undertake a review of Canada's competition policies and its framework for foreign investment policy. The government's objective is to ensure that Canada's policies keep pace with changes in the global economy (including the opening of national markets, the increase in global investments and the orientation of production around global supply chains) in order to create a highly competitive national economy and help create more and better jobs for Canadians.
The Consultation Paper is thoughtful, well written and comprehensive. It is designed to facilitate discussion that will enable the CPRP to provide recommendations to the government on how to enhance Canadian productivity and competitiveness. It notes that the CPRP will no longer consider issues related to state-owned enterprises and national security as the government has indicated its intent to provide more immediate attention to these issues.
On October 29, 2007 the Competition Bureau ("Bureau") released its Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study, initiated in September, 2006, to identify areas where changes in the market framework might attain greater benefits through competition. The study was initiated in response to several studies that had found the price of prescription generics to be high in Canada compared to other countries.1
On October 10, 2007, following consultations that began in 2005, the Competition Bureau (the Bureau) published a new information bulletin outlining its policies on the communication of confidential information (the New Bulletin). The New Bulletin updates a previous information bulletin on the same subject (published in 1995) in order to provide more practical guidance and to reflect subsequent amendments to the Competition Act (the Act) as well as increasing international cooperation between competition authorities.
Confirming the bulletin issued in 1995, the Bureau states that its general policy is to minimize the extent to which confidential information is communicated outside the Bureau, and that it will be vigilant in avoiding the communication of confidential information unless it is specifically permitted by the Act, and even if it is permitted, will consider whether the disclosure is advisable or necessary.
On July 26, 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) issued its decision in the case of Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc. The SCC allowed the appeal of Euro Excellence, thereby disallowing Kraft Canada's claim of secondary infringement of copyright against Euro Excellence.
While the SCC's decision to allow the appeal was made by a margin of seven to two, a deeply divided SCC produced four sets of reasons in reversing the decisions of both the Federal Court of Appeal (2005 FCA 427) and Federal Court (2004 FC 652). The decision raises interesting questions about the interface of intellectual property and competition law, in particular the extent to which copyright law can and should be used to limit competition from grey-market imports.
Any discussion of the enforcement cooperation activities of the Canadian Competition Bureau (the Bureau) and the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission (the Commission) must at this stage focus not only on communications between them but also on results. It would appear that after years of working together in both bilateral and multilateral fora on the development of competition law enforcement policies and practices, and of cooperationin the investigation of individual cases, different results are still sometimes apparent. That said, the ultimate goal of consistency and convergence among the agencies can only be achieved through continued such dialogue and cooperation, and overall the glass should likely still be viewed as half full.
Sheridan Scott, the Commissioner of Competition, has recently stated that, together with Industry Canada and the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, the Competition Bureau has commissioned a review paper of several major issues arising at the interface between competition law and intellectual property law. This project will include a top level symposium early in 2007.
The issues identified by the Commissioner at this time will clearly be viewed as significant in a variety of industries that heavily invest in innovation. The issues under review include:
Authorized generic drugs - the extent to which brand-name pharmaceutical companies have launched authorized generics, and the impact this may have had on the entry of other generics.
Collective management of copyright -does the current system of copyright collectives minimize transaction costs and encourage new works?
Official marks - the impact of the current system on competition, and whether competition principles can improve the system.
IP rights extension - the ways in which firms have attempted to extend their IP rights.
Compulsory licensing - do the current statutory provisions meet their legislative intent? What alternatives are available?
Tying - when can bundling practices extend IP protection and block innovation?
International context - a comparison of Canada's patent regime with its international obligations, and consideration of whether the current regime could be improved.
Innovation is obviously a very important part of the economy. IP rights and competition principles can in some cases conflict, or be difficult to reconcile. The Commissioner's interest in developing a better understanding of these issues can only be viewed as positive. However, there is much room for debate on most if not all of the above issues and interested parties - particularly innovation-based businesses - will want to follow this closely.
For more information, please contact the author, Shawn C.D. Neylan, or your Stikeman Elliott representative, or any other member of the Competition/Antitrust Group.
In addition to the foregoing amendments, the IESO Board unanimously approved further amendments to remedy counter-intuitive pricing. The purpose of these amendments is to allow the IESO to make changes to real-time pricing signals in order to hopefully reduce the instances of counter-intuitive pricing. The proposed amendments are two-fold. First, emergency energy purchases may produce counter-intuitive pricing because they reduce demand in constrained sequences by an amount equivalent to the emergency energy purchase; the dispatch scheduling algorithm automatically carries that demand reduction to the market schedule which thereby depresses the market price. As such, section 3.2.1.4 in Appendix 7.5 will be amended so that demand in the market schedule is not reduced when the IESO makes emergency energy purchases (although demand will still be reduced in the constrained schedule so that other resources are dispatched appropriately). Second, other emergency control actions such as voltage reductions or load cuts may produce counter-intuitive pricing because they result in an actual decrease in electricity demand. Accordingly, a new section 3.2.1.12 will be added to Appendix 7.5 to enable the IESO to increase or decrease demand in the market schedule to offset the counter-intuitive impact on market pricing and market signals triggered by emergency control actions.
The Competition Bureau (the Bureau) is seeking public comment on a revised "Information Bulletin on the Communication and Treatment of Information under the Competition Act (Draft for Consultation, August 2005)". As the original policy was introduced in 1995, the revised bulletin reflects amendments made to the Competition Act (the Act) in 2002. The Bureau notes, in particular, that section 29 of the Act also protects information provided voluntarily pursuant to the Act, rather than only protecting information obtained using formal powers, as had previously been the case.
The revised bulletin also provides examples illustrating when, in the Bureau's view, information can be communicated to third parties under the various exceptions to section 29. It also clarifies the treatment of information when it is communicated to or received from foreign authorities. Finally, the revised bulletin includes a section discussing other matters where the treatment of information is of concern; for example, the Bureau's Immunity Program, the whistle-blowing provisions, binding written opinions, the right of access to records, requests under the Access to Information Act, private actions for damages and private access to the Competition Tribunal.
The Bureau will accept comments on the revised bulletin until December 2, 2005
A cooperation agreement to improve competition law enforcement between the governments of Canada and Japan was signed on September 6, 2005. The agreement is similar to existing agreements that Canada has signed with the United States, the European Communities and Mexico. It will come into force on October 6, 2005, and is available on the Competition Bureau's website.
A key aspect of Canada's consent procedure for settling matters with the Commissioner of Competition (the Commissioner) before the Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) has come under attack. The procedure was streamlined in 2002, with a change from the issuance by the Tribunal of an order on consent, often following a hearing, to the simple registration of a consent agreement - which then has the force of an order of the Tribunal.
There are several differences between the old and the new procedures, one being that supporting evidence is no longer filed with the Tribunal, and another being that the scope for intervention by third parties is (or was thought to have been) significantly narrowed. Previously, intervenors in consent order proceedings could potentially delay them for months, as in the case of Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (1989), 45 B.L.R. 1 (Comp. Trib.), or even derail them altogether. Under the new procedures, potential intervenors are limited to an application to vary or rescind a consent agreement, within sixty days after its registration. In addition, they must show that they are directly affected by the agreement, and that the terms of the agreement "could not be the subject of an order of the Tribunal."
In the Fall of 2004, Canada's Commissioner of Competition (the "Commissioner") called for comments on a Consultation Paper issued by the Competition Bureau which dealt with the treatment of efficiencies under the Competition Act.1 On March 18, 2005, pursuant to calls by the Canadian Bar Association and others for more in-depth analysis, she announced that an advisory panel of experts had been appointed to assess the role that efficiencies should play "in the context of Canada's economy in the 21st century".
A springboard for this debate was the decision in The Commissioner of Competition v. Superior Propane,2in whichthe Federal Court of Appeal ultimately upheld the Competition Tribunal's decision that section 96 of the Act applied to save an otherwise anti-competitive merger, because the evidence showed that the efficiencies likely to be generated by the merger outweighed its likely anti-competitive effects. In so doing, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the use of the "total surplus" standard for the measurement of anti-competitive effects in all cases. The appropriate treatment of efficiencies has also been the subject of debate in other countries, including the European Union, where Section VII of the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines sought to clarify the European approach, and more recently, the United States, where the Antitrust Modernization Committee will study whether current policies are appropriate and effective.
The Canadian Advisory Panel on Efficiencies will consider the general economic and business implications of the current treatment of efficiencies under the Competition Act as well as the characteristics required of Canada's competition policy in order to ensure that efficiencies are properly addressed. The Panel is to report to the Commissioner by June, 2005 - a somewhat short time-frame for such a task.
Canada and Japan recently announced that they have agreed on the major elements of a draft cooperation agreement. The draft agreement is modeled on those already in place between Canada and the U.S., the U.K., and the E.U. It is to include five elements: notification of enforcement activities that may affect important interests of the other party; co-operation in the form of assistance to one another's competition authorities; co-ordination of enforcement activities in mutually related matters; "positive comity" through requests for enforcement action to be taken by the other party in relation to conduct affecting important interests of the requesting party; and "negative comity" through the careful consideration of important interests of the other party in enforcement activities.
The draft agreement is the product of several rounds of negotiations that were first announced in November 2002. With the major elements settled, it still remains for these elements to be put into the form of a definitive agreement.
In her first address to the National Competition Law Section of the Canadian Bar Association since her appointment last January, the Commissioner took the opportunity in her annual address to the fall Competition Law Conference in Ottawa on September 23, 2004 to announce several new policy initiatives. Of particular note to competition law practitioners and in-house counsel are the following:
On June 28, 2004, the Competition Tribunal denied an application by Canadian Waste Services Inc. (CWS) (Now Waste Management of Canada Corporation) to rescind an October 2001 order under section 92 (mergers) requiring the divestiture of the Ridge landfill in Chatham, Ontario. In May 2003, CWS applied to the Tribunal to set aside the divestiture order under s. 106 of the Competition Act on the basis that the circumstances that led to the making of the order had changed, and that in the present circumstances, the Tribunal would not have made the order. The Tribunal's decision is currently under appeal. Although the Tribunal's recent decision terminated the July 10, 2003 stay of its order to divest the Ridge landfill, on August 6, 2004, the Federal Court of Appeal granted a stay of the divestiture order pending appeal of the Tribunal's recent s. 106 decision. The appeal is scheduled to be heard on November 4, 2004.
On February 27, 2004, the Competition Bureau announced that it had closed its inquiry into alleged misuses of Canada's drug patent rules by brand name pharmaceutical companies. Despite expressing some concerns about whether the appropriate balance existed in Canada between "protecting intellectual property rights and facilitating a competitive supply of pharmaceutical products for Canadian consumers", the Bureau concluded that the Competition Act "is not the appropriate vehicle for resolving what amounts to a patent dispute between two firms."1
The Government of Canada confirmed on Monday, November 10, 2003 that the out-going Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, has filled the position of Commissioner of Competition, with the appointment of Sheridan Scott, currently Chief Regulatory Officer for Bell Canada. The position, Canada's senior competition law enforcement post, has been vacant since the August 14, 2003 appointment of Konrad von Finckenstein to the bench of the Federal Court of Canada. Although not a Bureau insider, Ms. Scott has extensive public and private sector credentials, having clerked at the Supreme Court of Canada before serving with the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (during which time the CRTC held, among other things, land-mark hearings on long distance de-regulation) and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and is well-known in Ottawa circles. The appointment has been received positively.
Comments have been invited on the government's proposed amendments to section 45 of the Competition Act, to be outlined in a June, 2003 discussion paper. At a recent conference, senior Competition Bureau officials announced the forthcoming release of a discussion paper outlining the Government's proposals on the next round of amendments to the Competition Act. The paper, which is expected to be released in late June 2003, would affect four areas of the Competition Act by:
strengthening enforcement of the civil provisions to achieve deterrence and encourage compliance;
introducing a dual criminal/civil track review of agreements between competitors;
replacing the criminal pricing provisions relating to price discrimination, predatory pricing and promotional allowances with a civil provision containing a competition effects test; and
enabling the Commissioner of Competition to ask the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) to inquire into the state of competition in any industry sector
On April 1, 2003, long-anticipated changes to the thresholds for merger notification under the Competition Act (the "Act") and to Competition Bureau (the "Bureau") fees, service standards and advisory opinions process came into effect. These include:
an increase in the transaction-size threshold for merger notification from C$35 million to C$50 million;
the doubling of fees for merger notification filings and Advance Ruling Certificates (ARCs) from C$25,000 to C$50,000;
the coming into force of a recent amendment to the Act providing for legally binding written opinions from the Commissioner of Competition (the "Commissioner") on proposed business conduct; and
an increase in fees for written opinions from the Commissioner.
The Bureau describes these changes as enhancing client service, presumably as a result of benefits derived from higher fees, the availability of binding opinions and a reduction in the regulatory burden for smaller businesses.
Bureau Will Apply Identical Standards to Online Representations and Traditional Media
On February 18, 2003, the Competition Bureau (the "Bureau") released its Information Bulletin on the Application of the Competition Act to Representations on the Internet (the "Bulletin"). The Bulletin is designed to ensure that businesses that are making online representations understand their responsibilities under the misleading representation and deceptive marketing provisions of the Competition Act (the "Act"). The Bulletin, which followed a consultation process with stakeholders, details the Bureau's approach to the application of the Act to online representations. The Bureau's position is that the Act applies equally to false or misleading representations, regardless of the medium used, and that the same basic principles that govern truthfulness in traditional advertising and marketing practices apply to their online counterparts. The Bureau does not believe that the enforcement of the Act will bias business activity either toward or away from the Internet.
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