The Competitor : Canada Competition / Antitrust Blog by Stikeman Elliott Lawyers & Attorneys

Michael Laskey -

On February 1, 2011, the Competition Bureau issued a statement in respect of the proposed acquisition of CTVglobemedia Inc. by BCE Inc. The statement noted that the Bureau was “cognizant of the growing trend toward vertical integration in the broadcasting industry” and that it was reviewing issues of vertical foreclosure. The statement also noted that the Commissioner of Competition would “closely monitor” the CRTC’s vertical integration hearings and subsequent regulatory developments in that same regard.

On September 21, 2011, the CRTC released its decision, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-601, setting out a regulatory framework for vertical integration among broadcasting and programming companies. In its decision, the CRTC imposes a number of restrictions on the activities of “vertically integrated” companies, which for the purposes of the decision it defines as companies that control both programming services (such as conventional television stations) and distribution services (such as cable or satellite systems). More specifically, some of the restrictions imposed by the decision include:

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David Elder and Lindsay Gwyer  -

Life is about to get more difficult for foreign telemarketers that flout domestic Do Not Call rules, as twelve global regulators have joined forces to create an international enforcement network.

On October 28, 2011 the CRTC announced the creation of an International Do Not Call Network to facilitate international cooperation on telemarketing enforcement and hopefully reduce the amount of unauthorized telemarketing calls Canadians receive from abroad. 

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Michael Laskey -

The Competition Tribunal today released an interim supply order requiring the Insurance Bureau of Canada to continue to supply access to its Web Claims Search Application to the Used Car Dealers Association of Ontario. The IBC, which consented to the interim supply order, must continue to supply the UCDA until the disposition of the UCDA’s application under the refusal to supply provision (section 75) of the Competition Act.

As described in our earlier article, the UCDA alleges that the IBC is refusing to supply it with automobile accident history data, which the UCDA says it requires in order to supply its Auto Check service to its members. The UCDA was granted leave to bring its application on September 9, 2011, and the matter is currently pending before the Tribunal.

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D. Jeffrey Brown and Lindsay Gwyer -  

In a recent decision, the Competition Tribunal granted the Commissioner of Competition’s motion requesting that the Toronto Dominion Bank (TD) produce complete versions of a number of documents, including several that had previously been produced in a redacted form. The motion was part of the Commissioner’s proceedings against Visa Canada and Mastercard International under the Competition Act’s civil resale price maintenance (RPM) provision, enacted as part of the substantial amendments to the Competition Act in 2009. TD was granted leave to intervene in that proceeding in respect of a number of issues earlier this year.

The motion stemmed from the redaction by TD of certain documents produced by it in response to the Tribunal’s order granting it leave to intervene, which also ordered it to produce documents relative to the issues within the scope of its intervention. TD submitted that redactions are permitted if information is irrelevant and confidential, or if it is contained in an irrelevant portion of a segmented document. The Tribunal rejected this view, and held that, as a general rule, irrelevant portions of otherwise relevant documents must be disclosed. After reviewing relevant jurisprudence, the Tribunal held that redaction is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the redacted information is embarrassing or harmful or where there is an “enormous” volume of redacted material.

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D. Jeffrey Brown and Robert Mysicka - 

In a recent ruling, Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice explored the principles underlying the law respecting sealing orders and its application to reviewable matters under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act.  On a motion by the Commissioner of Competition, the Court issued a partial confidentiality (or sealing) order with respect to certain information used by the Commissioner in her application against Rogers Communications Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Chatr Wireless Inc., for alleged misleading advertising. Information about “dropped call” rates, which the Court characterized as being at the “very heart” of the Commissioner’s application, was excluded from the sealing order after the Court determined that it was essential for that aspect of the proceedings to remain transparent. 

Investigation into Misleading Advertising

The application to which the confidentiality order relates originated in November, 2010, when the Competition Bureau commenced legal proceedings against Rogers and Chatr. The Bureau’s application came after complaints were made by competing discount wireless carriers, Wind Mobile and Mobilicity, alleging that Rogers’ Chatr discount brand was misleading consumers into believing that its network was more reliable and had fewer “dropped calls” than those of other discount carriers.

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Megan MacDonald -

On October 6, 2011, the Competition Bureau announced the publication of the final version of its revised Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs), only thirteen months after announcing its intention to review the guidelines in September 2010. The revised MEGs replace both the 2004 version of the guidelines and the Bureau’s 2009 Efficiencies in Merger Review bulletin.

The revisions aim to better describe the Bureau’s analytical approach to merger review by addressing discrete areas where the 2004 MEGs no longer fully reflected Bureau practice or current economic and legal thinking. It is generally understood that the 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (U.S. Guidelines) also constituted an important factor driving the need for review. Whereas the U.S. Guidelines are limited to horizontal mergers, however, the revised MEGs also address vertical merger analysis and go further than the U.S. Guidelines with respect to horizontal merger analysis by incorporating more recent thinking on Canada’s own unique efficiencies defence.

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Jeffrey Brown -

On October 5, 2011, the Competition Bureau released a “Position Statement” summarizing its approach in reviewing Canadian Tire’s recent acquisition of the Forzani Group.  The transaction, which took the form of a takeover bid, was announced on May 9, 2011, and the Bureau cleared the transaction on August 3, 2011.  The transaction provided the Bureau with the relatively rare opportunity to review a retail merger between retailers carrying on business using different business models: Forzani is a national sporting goods retailer (including sports apparel and equipment), and Canadian Tire is a mass merchandiser selling products, through a network of independent dealers, across a range of categories, including sporting goods as well as automotive parts, tools, house wares and electronics.

In reviewing the transaction, the Position Statement notes that the Bureau analysed its potential competitive effects in a number of possible product markets (retail sale of sporting equipment; retail sale of certain sporting equipment categories, such as hockey equipment; and the retail sale of specific sporting equipment products, such as hockey skates), but ultimately concluded that it was not necessary to conclusively define the relevant product market(s) in light of econometric evidence showing that neither party responded competitively to the presence of the other in local markets, and to evidence that this was unlikely to change post-merger. To our knowledge, this is the first time the Bureau has expressly relied on such a competitive effects analysis in its assessment of a merger, although the potential for such an approach was signalled in its draft revisions to the Merger Enforcement Guidelines, published earlier in 2011.

Stikeman Elliott LLP acted as competition counsel to Canadian Tire, with a team consisting of Lawson Hunter, Jeffrey Brown, Paul Beaudry, Megan MacDonald and Alexandra Stockwell.

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