Bell Canada to pay $10-million penalty for misleading advertising

Ashley Weber and Jennifer Rad -

On June 28, 2011, Bell Canada entered into a Consent Agreement with the Commissioner of Competition that will require Bell to pay a $10-million administrative monetary penalty for making false or misleading representations in its advertising regarding the prices consumers are required to pay for its Home Phone, Internet, Television, and Wireless services. 

Upon completion of its investigation, the Competition Bureau concluded that Bell has, since December 2007, advertised monthly prices which were lower than the actual price it charges consumers for its services. Section 74.01 of the Competition Act prohibits any representation to the public, for the purposes of promoting a product, that is false or misleading in a material respect, and takes into account both the general impression conveyed by a representation as well as its literal meaning.

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Federal Court of Appeal dismisses Refusal to Deal appeal

Susan M. Hutton & Marisa Berswick

On June 2, 2011, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) released its decision in Nadeau Poultry Farm Limited v. Groupe Westco Inc et al., in which it upheld the decision of the Competition Tribunal to dismiss the appellant’s complaint under s. 75 of the Competition Act (refusal to deal). While the appellant was ultimately unsuccessful, both decisions shed light on the limited scope of s. 75, particularly in regulated industries where supply is statutorily restricted.

The Decision at the Tribunal

As discussed in our post of November 19, 2009, this case concerns a dispute between the appellant, Nadeau Poultry Farm, the operator of the only chicken slaughtering plant in New Brunswick, and the main respondent, Group Westco Inc., a chicken producer that, along with its subsidiaries, owns or controls just over half of the chicken production in New Brunswick. In 2007, Westco offered to buy or invest in the Nadeau plant, but negotiations between the parties broke down. Westco made it clear that if Nadeau was not willing to sell its plant, Westco would construct its own slaughtering plant in partnership with Nadeau’s main competitor and thereby deprive Nadeau of 50% of its supply. Eventually, Westco gave written notice that it would stop supplying chickens to Nadeau and the other respondents followed soon after, leading to the commencement of a private action before the Competition Tribunal for an order for resumed supply. On June 8, 2009, the Tribunal dismissed the application based on Nadeau’s inability to satisfy the five conditions required by s. 75, which require that:

  • a customer is substantially affected in its business or is precluded from carrying on business because it is unable to obtain adequate supplies of a product anywhere in a market on usual trade terms; 
  • this occurs as a result of insufficient competition among suppliers; 
  • the customer is willing and able to meet usual trade terms;
  • the product is in ample supply; and 
  • the refusal to deal is having or is likely to have an adverse affect on competition in a market.
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Groupon falls afoul of UK advertising regulator

Ashley Weber and Graeme Deuchars  -

On June 8, 2011, the UK Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) found that online coupon provider Groupon, Inc. had misrepresented the ordinary selling price of a third party service that was advertised to Groupon’s online subscribers, and ordered Groupon to remove the advertisement from circulation.  The ASA also ordered Groupon to ensure its compliance with proper advertising policies, so as to prevent similar events in the future.  The decision is one of several regulatory decisions by the ASA in recent months, illustrating that – despite disclaimers to the contrary in the terms of use - “deal-a-day” online websites offering “red flag” or “last minute” for third party products and services may not be immune to scrutiny for representations made in online advertising in the UK, and possibly elsewhere.  Whether such services could rely upon the exception in Canada’s Competition Act for those who “print, publish or otherwise disseminate” an advertisement has not been tested.

The ASA decision came in response to a complaint that Groupon had overstated the savings for a third party salon treatment that was offered to Groupon subscribers at “£24 instead of £90”. The ASA found that Groupon did not have adequate evidence to substantiate the ordinary selling price of £90 in order to make the savings claim (Groupon had relied on an e-mail price list provided by the third party salon which quoted the regular price of the treatment).  The ASA ruled that the advertisement could not appear again in its current form, and informed Groupon that it would need to obtain documentary evidence of its suppliers’ pre-discount prices for future advertising.

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Draft revisions to Canadian MEGs released for comment

Susan M. Hutton and Marisa Berswick

On June 27, 2011, the Competition Bureau issued draft revisions to Canada’s Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs).  The MEGs, last revised in 2004, set forth general direction on the Bureau’s analytical approach to merger review under Part VIII of the Competition Act. On February 24, 2011, the Commissioner announced that the Bureau would undertake “moderate revisions” to the MEGs. An important factor driving the current revisions is generally understood to be the 2010 revisions to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (U.S. Guidelines), although the Canadian revisions did not simply adopt those made in the U.S. In addition, the Canadian MEGs address both horizontal and vertical merger analysis and reflect more recent thinking on our own unique efficiencies defence. The Bureau is seeking public feedback on its draft revised MEGs by August 31, 2011, with a view to publishing them in final form in the fall of 2011.

Substantively, the draft revised MEGs do not appear to indicate dramatic shifts in Bureau merger enforcement policy or practice.   They do adopt a more nuanced approach to market definition, however, and provide more detail regarding the Bureau’s approach to monopsony (buyer) power, minority interests and interlocking directorates, the use of various economic tools in the analysis of competition between firms with differentiated products (“upward pricing pressure” as such is not specifically mentioned, but is very much there in spirit), a change in the approach to assessing whether entry is likely to be “timely”, a more nuanced treatment of coordinated effects, and an expanded analysis of anti-competitive effects in non-horizontal mergers. The revisions are intended to address areas where the 2004 MEGs no longer fully reflected Bureau practice and current economic and legal thinking.

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